PURPOSE AND SCOPE
To date, the project has established important to safety (ITS) performance requirements for structures, systems and components (SSCs) based on identification and categorization of event sequences that may result in a radiological release. These performance requirements are defined within the Nuclear Safety Design Basis for License Application (NSDB) (BSC 2005) . Further, SSCs credited with performing safe functions are classified as ITS. In turn, performance confirmation for these SSCs is sought through the use of consensus code and standards.
The purpose of this study is to identify applicable codes and standards for the waste package (WP) transporter and transport locomotive ITS SSCs. Further, this study will form the basis for selection and the extent of applicability of each code and standard.
This study is based on the design development completed for License Application only. Accordingly, identification of ITS SSCs beyond those defined within the NSDB are based on designs that may be subject to further development during detail design. Furthermore, several design alternatives may still be under consideration to satisfy certain safety hctions, and that final selection will not be determined until further design development has occurred. Therefore, for completeness, throughout this study alternative designs currently under consideration will be discussed. Further, the results of this study will be subject to evaluation as part of a follow-on gap analysis study.
Based on the results of this study the gap analysis will evaluate each code and standard to ensure each ITS performance requirement is fully satisfied. When a performance requirement is not fully satisfied a "gap" is highlighted. Thereafter, the study will identify supplemental requirements to augment the code or standard to meet performance requirements. Further, the gap analysis will identify non-standard areas of the design that will be subject to a Development Plan. Non-standard components and non-standard design configurations are defined as areas of the design that do not follow standard industry practices or codes and standards. Whereby, performance confirmation can not be readily sought through use of consensus standards.
In order for this to be accomplished, a control schematic will be developed to correlate with the baseline configuration presented in the Waste Package Transporter Preclosure Safety Analysis (BSC 2004 
QUALITY ASSURANCE
This document was prepared in accordance with LP-ENG-0 14-BSC, Engineering Studies. The results of this document are only to be used as the basis for selection of applicable codes and 800-30R-HE00-00400-000-000 standards and are not to be used directly to generate quality products. Therefore, this engineering study is not subject to requirements of the Quality Assurance Requirements and Description document (DOE 2004) .
USE OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Computer software used, Microsoft Word 1997, in this study is classified as exempt from procedure LP-SI. 1 1 Q-BSC, Software Management. All software used to prepare this analysis is listed under Section 2.1 Software Not Subject To This Procedure, of LP-SI.11Q-BSC, Software Management.
TRANSPORT LOCOMOTIVE AND WP TRANSPORTER FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION
Before these ITS Codes and standards can be identified, a basic control block diagram needs to be developed to correlate with the baseline configuration presented in the Waste Package Transporter Preclosure Safety Analysis. Within the Waste Package Transporter Preclosure Safety Analysis, a fault tree analysis was performed with two possible alternatives that meet the necessary reliability. Alternative 1 is a single-channel dynamic brake in conjunction with the basic service brake system (BSC 2004, Section 6.8.2). Alternative 2 is a single-channel independent brake in conjunction with the basic service brake system (BSC 2004, Section 6.8.3).
LOCOMOTIVE
The primary function of the transport locomotive is to move the WP transporter and other railbased support equipment utilized by the emplacement and retrieval system, such as the gantry carrier and WP transporter.
800-30R-HE00-00400-000-000 
Transport Locomotive Basic Control System

WP TRANSPORTER
The primary function of the WP transporter is to safely transport waste packages between the Surface Facilities and the emplacement transfer docks for both emplacement and retrieval operations. The transport locomotive provides the motive force for all movements of the waste package transporter. The transporter primarily consists of a radiological shielded enclosure (with bedplate) mounted to a railcar. 
4.2.1
ITS REQUIREMENTS FOUND
The ITS requirements that were identified in this study were directly taken out of the Nuclear Safety Design Basis for License Application (BSC 2005). There were no additional ITS requirements identified other than the thirteen ITS requirements listed in the Nuclear Safety Design Basis for License Application (BSC 2005) . See Section 8 for a listing of other documents reviewed.
REQUIREMENTS
Each requirement that was identified in the NSDB has been assigned its own requirement number, and is highlighted in an italic font, in this document.
Requirement 1
"The WP Transporter shall transport the WP in a manner such that i f a collision or derailment (excluding tipover) occurs, the WP impact energy will be low enough to preclude a WP breach; this impact energy translates into a maximum WP Transporter speed of 15 mph" (BSC 2005, Table A-11) .
Since the transporter shall not exceed the speed of 15 mph, the following are ITS functions: speed detection, speed limitinghraking, and the coupler connection and detection. The coupler connection and detection is ITS because the locomotive assists in the speed limitinghraking function and therefore must remain coupled to the WP Transporter. The SSC performing the speed detection function is a speed sensor. The SSCs performing the speed limitinghraking function are the dynamic braking (Alternative 1 only), the pneumatic tread brake system, and the disc brake system (Alternative 2 only). The SSC performing the ITS function for the coupler connection detection is the coupler sensor. With these SSCs, the interlocking controls also have to be ITS. The SCS receives information from the speed sensor and activates the dynamic braking if the maximum speed is exceeded. If the excessive speed is continued, the TCS and LCS then activates the brakes through the LBCS and TBCS. 800-30R-HE00-00400-000-000 
ITS Function
I Code and Standard Reference
The height at which the WP is transported is ITS to ensure that in the event of a tipover the WP impact energy with the grade will be low enough to preclude a WP breach. This will be addressed later during the gap analysis. 
Code and Standard Reference
In extreme straight wind, the SSCs must maintain their safety function. Therefore, the design must contain barriers to protect the SSCs and will be addressed later in the gap analysis. To prevent a collision with the WP on the WP turntable, the following are ITS functions: transporter / bedplate limit switches, and the braking. The SSC performing the transporter limit switch function is a position sensor. The SSC performing the bedplate limit switch function is a bedplate position sensor. The SSCs performing the braking function are the pneumatic tread brake subsystem, and the disc brake subsystem (Alternative 2 only). With these SSCs, the interlocking controls also have to be ITS. 800-30R-HE00-00400-000-000 runaways per trQ7, (BSC To prevent WP transporter runaway, the following are ITS functions: speed detection, speed limitinghraking, and the coupler connection and detection. The SSC performing the speed detection function is a speed sensor. The SSCs performing the speed limitinghraking functions are the dynamic braking (Alternative 1 only), the pneumatic tread brake system, and the disc brake system (Alternative 2 only). The coupler sensors are the SSCs that sense the coupler connection. With these SSCs, the interlocking controls also have to be ITS. The SCS receives information from the speed sensor and activates the dynamic braking if the maximum speed is exceeded. If the excessive speed is continued, the TCS and LCS then activates the brakes through the LBCS and TBCS. To prevent WP transporter runaway from the DBGM-2 seismic event, the following are ITS functions: speed detection, speed limitinghraking, and the coupler connection detection. The speed detection ITS function is performed by the speed sensors. The speed limitinghraking ITS function is performed by the SCS, the dynamic braking (Alternative l), the pneumatic tread braking, and the disc braking (Alternative 2). The coupler sensors are the SSCs that sense the coupler connection. With these SSCs, the interlocking controls also have to be ITS. The SCS receives information from the speed sensor and activates the dynamic braking if the maximum speed is exceeded. If the excessive speed is continued, the TCS and LCS then activates the braking through the LBCS and TBCS. 800-30R-HE00-00400-000-000 With a DBGM-1 level seismic event, the shielding integrity must remain intact. The WP transporter shielded compartment, shield doors, shield door hinges, and shield door locking mechanism must be designed and constructed to provide the required shielding after a DBGM-1 level seismic event. After a rockfall/failed ground support event, the structural integrity must remain intact. The WP transporter shielded compartment and shield doors must be designed and constructed to provide the required structural protection for the WP after a rockfalVfailed ground support event (with a total mass of 5.4 MT). Inadvertent actuation of the WP shielded doors should be precluded such that it is not a Category 1 event. Therefore, the ITS function is restricting areas where the shield doors can open when a radioactive source is present. Also, preventing the shield doors opening in maintenance areas with a radiation source within the shielded compartment. Therefore, the ITS functions are the position locator and radiation source detection. The position sensor performs the position locator function; and the radiation detector performs the radiation source detection fhction. With these SSCs, the interlocking controls also have ITS functions. The TCS receives information from the PCS and the radiation detector and permits the opening of the shield doors. The PCS receives information from the position sensor and determines the location of the WP Transporter. Upon loss of power, the ITS h c t i o n is braking. The SSCs performing the braking fwnction are the pneumatic tread brake system and the disc brake system (Alternative 2 only); The Transport Locomotive and WP Transporter automatically enter fail safe condition. For example, during power loss the brakes automatically engage. Upon power restoration, operator action must be performed to reset and restart the Transport Locomotive and WP Transporter motion. 800-30R-HE00-00400-000-000
IDENTIFIED ITS CODES AND STANDARDS
In order to capture all of the codes and standards an exhaustive study was performed. This study consisted of an evaluation of industry consensus codes and standards to identify applicability to the ITS SSCs. Refer to Section 8.5 for a list of codes, standards, regulations, and directives reviewed for this section. The codes and standards selected were based upon their applicability to the requirements of the ITS SSCs, in particular within a nuclear environment. The evaluation of the identified industry codes and standards (see section 7.2 for a list of identified Industry Codes and Standards) looked at the applicable sections of each code and standard. This was done to ensure that' the design, construction, installation, testing, and operations were all analyzed to show how each of the particular SSC will satisfy the ITS requirements.
-Note: The extent of the applicability of each code and standard identified will be further defined through the completion of a subsequent gap analysis study.
TRANSPORT LOCOMOTIVE
Transport Locomotive Control System
The codes and standards listed in Table 6 .1.1-1 will be used in their entirety. The locomotive control system (LCS) provides the operator local control console, and radio frequency (FW)
communications to the operators in the main control system (MCS) (see 800-30R-HE00-00400-000-000 
Transport Locomotive Speed Control System
This section is applicable in Alternative 1 only. Even though standard AAR 2004, Section M Standard S-5018 is specific to diesel-electric locomotives, some of the principles presented may be applicable to an electric locomotive. It is however, the only established railroad standard for dynamic braking. Further analysis needs to be performed and dynamic braking will be addressed later within the gap analysis.
The codes and standards listed in Table 6 .1.1-2 will be used in their entirety. The locomotive speed control system (SCS) provides the instrumentation and speed control capability to the local operators and to the operators in the main control system (MCS) via the LCS (see Figure 4 .3.1-1 and Figure 4 .4.1-1). The SCS interfaces with the LCS, dynamic brake, drive system, and the speed sensor. The SCS will contain the functional and design requirements established in IEEE 603-1998 and IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 for the instrumentation and control portions of the SCS. The additional IEEE and ANSUISA Standards will provide the installatiodmounting, independence, setpoints, single failure criteria, and qualification requirements for the system.
For this requirement, the speed sensor and the dynamic brake subsystem are ITS. The SCS applicable codes and standards are shown in Table 6 .1.1-2. 
IEEE Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems Standard Criteria for Independence of Class I E Equipment and Circuits Standard Criteria for Safety Systems in Nuclear Power Generating Stations
S67.04-2000
IEEE Std 379-2000*
Transport Locomotive Brake Control System
Entire
The LBCS interfaces the pneumatic tread brake subsystem and the disc brake system (Alternative 2 Only) (See Braking commands issued from the LCS are interrogated by the LBCS and the appropriate braking response is sent to the brakes. Braking can be applied independently to the locomotive, the transporter, or both the locomotive and the transporter.
The LBCS will contain the functional and design requirements established in IEEE Std 603-1998, and IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 for the instrumentation and control portions of the LBCS. The additional IEEE and ANSVISA Standards will provide the installatiodmounting, independence, Setpoints, single failure criteria, and qualification requirements for the system. 800-30R-HE00-00400-000-000 Table 6 .1.1-4, are the railroad industry brake standards for locomotives. With the current design, numerous AAR 2004, Section M standards apply. These standards discuss the braking system design and components for locomotives. As the design progresses and equipment selection is made, many of the standards will no longer apply.
The pneumatic tread brake subsystem gets braking commands from the TBCS (see Figure  4 .3.2-1 and Figure 4 .4.2-1) and modulates the pneumatic cylinder pressure to gradually apply pressure to the tread brakes. The pneumatic tread brake is actuated by an electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brake system. The ECP brake system allows the operator to apply a graduated increase or decrease of pneumatic pressure to the braking systems. This provides a graduated braking to the locomotive and transporter. The graduated braking is controlled by a microprocessor based control system that monitors brake cylinder pressure, reservoir tank, and pipe pressure. 800-30R-HE00-00400-000-000 The disc brake subsystem gets braking commands from the LBCS. Currently there are no codes and standards identified for disc braking systems. Disc brakes are typically used in passenger transit not in freight applications. This will be addressed later in the gap analysis. "the coupling system must be designed such that overriding will not occur and that the train will remain coupled together" (AAR S-2043).
Applicable Code or Standard
The coupler between the locomotive and the transporter has a sensor that verifies that the coupler is engaged or disengaged. The sensor when disengaged commands the transporter brake system to actuate (i.e. the transporter cannot be moved when disengaged from the locomotive). Table 6 .1.1-6. 
WP TRANSPORTER
WP Transporter Control System (TCS)
The TCS interfaces with the WP transporter brake control system (TBCS), bedplate control system (BPCS), shield door control system (SDCS), position control system (PCS), and the facility control system (FCS). Inputs are received from power, communications, sensors, and the radiation detector (see The TCS controls all activities onboard the transporter. The TCS interlocks the TBCS with the speed sensor, and locomotive (via communications cable) for excessive speed. Also, TCS interlocks the BPCS and SDCS to prevent closing of the shield doors on the WP. The TCS interlocks the radiation detection sensor, position detector, and PCS to allow the WP to be exposed only in acceptable areas (i.e. surface WP loading docks and emplacement drift docking area). The FCS communicates directly with the TCS at the surface WP loading dock (via the WP loading dock umbilical cable).
The TCS will contain the functional and design requirements established in IEEE Std 603-1998, and IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 for the instrumentation and control portions of the TCS. The additional IEEE and ANSUISA Standards will provide the installatiodmounting, independence, Setpoints, single failure criteria, and qualification requirements for the system. Therefore, the TCS is ITS and Table 6 .2.1-1 is a list of applicable codes and standards.
S67.04-2000
IEEE Std 603-1998* I Entire I Standard Criteria for Safety Systems in Nuclear Power Generating Stations * These nuclear standards apply for nuclear power industry and may not necessarily apply to rail SSCs.
WP Transporter Brake Control System
The TBCS contains the microprocessor electronics system that performs the functions of the ECP brake system. The TBCS commands the pneumatic tread brake system and disc brake system (Alternative 2 Only) to stop the transporter. The ECP has the capability to gradually apply brake pressure or in emergency situations, to fully engage the brakes.
The TBCS gets the braking commands from the TCS via the communications cable from the locomotive on board operator (see The TBCS will contain the functional and design requirements established in IEEE 603-1998 and IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 for the instrumentation and control portions of the TBCS. The additional IEEE and ANSYISA Standards will provide the installatiodmounting, independence, Setpoints, single failure criteria, and qualification requirements for the system. Therefore, the braking systems are ITS and the applicable codes and standards are listed in Table  6 .2.1-2.
Pneumatic Tread Brake Subsystem
The pneumatic tread brake subsystem gets braking commands from the TBCS and modulates the pneumatic cylinder pressure to gradually apply pressure to the tread brakes. The pneumatic tread brake is actuated by an ECP brake system. The ECP brake system allows the operator to apply a graduated increase or decrease of pneumatic pressure to the braking systems. This provides a graduated braking to the locomotive and transporter. The graduated braking is controlled by a microprocessor based control system that monitors brake cylinder pressure, reservoir tank, and pipe pressure. The pneumatic tread brake subsystems are ITS and the applicable codes and standards are listed in Table 6 .2.1-3. The disc brake subsystem gets braking commands from the TBCS. However, currently there are no codes and standards identified for disc braking systems. Disc brakes are typically used in passenger transit not in freight applications. This will be addressed later in the gap analysis.
Applicable Code or Standard
The disc brake subsystems are ITS and the applicable codes and standards are listed in Table  6 .2.1-4. 
Title Sections
WP Transporter Coupler
The WP transporter coupler contains the coupler sensors that send a signal to the TCS to verify the coupler is engaged. When the coupler sensor senses a disengaged coupler a signal is sent to set the transporter brakes. When the sensor senses an engaged coupler, a signal is sent to allow the transporter brakes to be disengaged. . Also Section 4.1.7.1 discusses that "the coupling system must be designed such that overriding will not occur and that the train will remain coupled together" (AAR S-2043).
The couplers maintain the connection between the transport locomotive and the WP transporter. Therefore, the coupler sensor connection is ITS and the applicable codes and standards are shown in Table 6 .2.1-5. 
Bedplate Control System
The bedplate control system (BPCS) contains the interlock logic that prohibits the inadvertent extending or retraction of the bedplate. When inputs from the logical interlocks are met, the BPCS sends the "extend" or "retract" commands to the bedplate drive system.
The BPCS controls the movement of the bedplate. The BPCS interlocks the drive mechanism, locking mechanism, and position sensor.
The BCS will contain the functional and design requirements established in IEEE 603-1998, and IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 for the instrumentation and control portions of the BCS. The additional IEEE and ANSVISA Standards will provide the installatiodmounting, independence, Setpoints, single failure criteria, and qualification requirements for the system.
The BPCS is ITS and Table 6 .2.1-6 is a list of applicable codes and standards.
800-30R-HE00-00400-000-000 The HLRM Cask in AAR S-2043 provides shielding from radioactive materials; likewise, the shielded compartment provides shielding from the WP. The bedplate, within the shielded compartment, supports the emplacement pallet, which serves as a cradle for the WP. Therefore per Paragraph 4.1.8 of the AAR S-2043, the bedplate locking mechanism "must have the ability to withstand any forces resulting from tie-down loads." Therefore, the bedplate locking mechanism is ITS and 
Bedplate Position Sensor
The bedplate position sensor inputs the bedplate position to the interlock logic in the BPCS. Position logic will not allow the bedplate to extend if inputs from the shield door sensors, for example, do not confirm that the doors are open. The bedplate position sensor indicates whether the bedplate is fully retracted or fully extended.
The ANSUISA Standard will provide the installatiodmounting requirements for the system.
The bedplate position sensor is ITS and Table 6 .2.1-8 is a list of applicable codes and standards.
800-30R-HE00-00400-000-000 The shield door control system (SDCS) contains the interlock logic that prohibits the inadvertent opening or closing of the shield doors. When inputs from the logical interlocks are met, the SDCS sends the open or close commands to the shield door drive system.
The SDCS controls the movement of the shield doors. The SDCS interlocks the drive mechanism, locking mechanism, and position sensor.
The SDCS will contain the functional and design requirements established in IEEE 603-1998, and IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 for the instrumentation and control portions of the SDCS. The additional IEEE and ANSVISA Standards will provide the installatiodmounting, independence, Setpoints, single failure criteria, and qualification requirements for the system.
The SDCS is ITS and Table 6 .2.1-9 is a list of applicable codes and standards.
Sections Title
Entire Entire
Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety Applications
SetDoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation 
Shield Door Locking Mechanism
The HLRM Cask in S-2043 provided shielding from radioactive materials; likewise, the shielded compartment provides shielding from the WP. Therefore AAR S-2043, Paragraph 4.1.8
indicates, the shield door locking mechanism "must have the ability to withstand any forces resulting from tie-down loads." The shield door locking mechanism is ITS and The HLRM Cask in S-2043 provided shielding from radioactive materials; likewise, the shielded compartment provides shielding from the WP. Therefore' AAR S-2043, Paragraph 4.1.8 indicates, the shield door hinges "must have the ability to withstand any forces resulting from tiedown loads." The shield door hinges are ITS and Table 6 .2.1-10 is a list of applicable codes and standards for the shield door hinges.
Applicable Code or Standard
ANSl/lSA-67.01.01- 
2002*
Shield Door Position Sensor
The shield door position sensor inputs the door position to the SDCS. The sensor will confirm the position of the shield doors to the SDCS control logic. The shield door position sensor indicates when the doors are full closed.
The ANSVISA Standard will provide the installatiodmounting requirements for the sensor.
The shield door position sensors are ITS and Table' 6.2.1-12 contains a list of applicable codes and standards. 800-30R-HE00-00400-000-000
Position Control System
The position control system (PCS) interlocks the shield door control logic such that the shield doors can only be opened in safe locations. Position sensors will be embedded in strategic locations within the surface and subsurface areas such that the interlock logic will only allow the shield doors to open in those locations (e.g. in the surface loading areas, and the emplacement gantry loading dock). The PCS permits the TCS to expose a radiation source in safe areas only.
The PCS will contain the hnctional and design requirements established in IEEE 603-1998, and IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 for the instrumentation and control portions of the PCS. The additional IEEE and ANSVISA Standards will provide the installatiodmounting, independence, Setpoints, single failure criteria, and qualification requirements for the system. Therefore PCS is ITS and Table 6 .2.1-13 is a list of applicable codes and standards. Table 6 .2.1-1 3: Position Control System Applicable Codes and Standards * These nuclear standards apply for nuclear power industry and may not necessarily apply to rail SSCs.
Position Sensor
The position sensors will be embedded in a suitable location such that instrumentation on board the transporter can sense the presence of the position sensor. When the position sensor is sensed, the logic will enable the shield door controls. In the absence of a position sensor, the shield doors cannot be opened automatically or remotely.
The IEEE and ANSYISA Standards will provide the installatiodmounting, independence, Setpoints, single failure criteria, and qualification requirements for the sensor.
The position sensor is ITS and the applicable codes and standards are shown in Table 6 .2.1-14.
800-30R-HE00-00400-000-000 The purpose of the radiation detection sensor is to detect the presence of a WP within the shielded compartment. The radiation detection sensor inputs the radiation level inside the shielded compartment to the interlock logic in the TCS. A radiation source detected within the shielded compartment will not allow a manual override to open the shield doors.
The IEEE and ANSVISA Standards will provide the installatiodmounting, independence, Setpoints, single failure criteria, and qualification requirements for the sensor.The radiation detection sensor is ITS and Table 6 .2.1-1 5 is a list of applicable codes and standards. 800-30R-HE00-00400-000-000
Transporter Shielded Doors and Compartment
Applicable Code or Standard
The HLRM Cask in S-2043 provided shielding from radioactive materials; likewise, the shielded doors and compartment provides shielding from the WP. Paragraph 4.1.8.2 requires that "...securement points on the car body must have the ability to withstand any forces resulting from the tie-down loads" (AAR S-2043).
Title
Sections
The AISC 1997, ANSUAISC N690-1994 and AWS Dl.l/Dl.lM:2004 will provide the construction of the shielded compartment. The ANSVANS-6.1 .l-1977 and ANSVANS-6.4-1985 will provide the design of the shielding for the shielded compartment.
Paragraph
AAR S-2043
Therefore, the transporter shielded doors and compartment structure must remain intact during and after a tipover or rockfall. Also, the shielded doors and compartment must maintain the shielding integrity for the protection of personnel. The transporter shielded doors and compartment are ITS and Table 6 .2.2-1, contains the applicable codes and standards. 
Performance Specification for Trains Used to Carry High Level Radioactive Material
Suspension Design
The suspension system is must be designed to remain stable in curves, turnouts, switches, etc during extreme straight winds (90 mph). This is to reduce the likelihood of a tipover.
In Paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3 of AAR S-2043, discusses the nonstructural static and dynamic analysis requirements for the suspension. However, the AAR S-2043 does not address the suspension response during extreme straight winds (90 mph). Therefore, this will be addressed in the gap analysis.
The suspension design is ITS and Table 6 .2.3-1 is a list of applicable codes and standards.
800-3OR-HE00-00400-000-000 
REVIEWED MATERIAL
The following lists indicate the, Project, Documents, Drawings, and Calculations/Analysis, the Industry Codes and Standards, the Regulatory Documents, the Federal Regulations and the DOE Documents reviewed in the performance of the study.
REVIEWED DOCUMENTS
Seven documents were identified as the documents to be used for this study. These documents were identified as documents that had potential ITS standards that could be found. Beginning with the Transport Locomotive / WP Transporter Design Calculation a list of documents with all references pertaining to the locomotive and transporter was generated. From this list of reference documents, another sub list of references was generated. This process was continued until a list of all the documents that could potentially discuss ITS requirements had been generated.
